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Abstract A risk-neutral valuation framework is developed for pricing and hedging in-play football
bets based on modelling scores by independent Poisson processes with constant intensities. The
Fundamental Theorems of Asset Pricing are applied to this set-up which enables us to derive novel
arbitrage-free valuation formulæ for contracts currently traded in the market. We also describe how
to calibrate the model to the market and how trades can be replicated and hedged.
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1. Introduction
In-play football bets are traded live during a football game. The prices of these bets
are driven by the goals scored in the underlying game in a way such that prices move
smoothly between goals and jump to a new level at times when goals are scored.
This is similar to financial markets where the price of an option changes according
to the price changes of the underlying instrument. We show that the Fundamental
Theorems of Asset Pricing can be applied to the in-play football betting market
and that these bets can be priced in the risk-neutral framework.
Distribution of final scores of football games has been studied by several authors.
In particular, Maher (1982) found that an independent Poisson distribution gives
a reasonably accurate description of football scores and achieved further improve-
ments by applying a bivariate Poisson distribution. This was further developed by
Dixon and Coles (1997) who proposed a model in which the final scores of the two
teams are not independent, but the marginal distributions of each team’s scores still
follow standard Poisson distributions.
Distribution of in-play goal times has been studied by Dixon and Robinson (1998)
who applied a state-dependent Poisson model where the goal intensities of the teams
depend on the current score and time. The model also accounts for other factors
such as home effect and injury time. The standard Poisson model has been applied
Correspondence Address: Department of Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, Lon-
don W1C 6BT, United Kingdom
ar
X
iv
:1
81
1.
03
93
1v
1 
 [q
-fi
n.T
R]
  2
9 O
ct 
20
18
November 12, 2018 . Football˙HEAD
by Fitt, Howls, and Kabelka (2005) to develop analytical valuation formulae for
in-play spread bets on goals and also on corners. A stochastic intensity model has
been suggested by Jottreau (2009) where the goals are driven by Poisson processes
with intensities that are stochastic, in particular driven by a Cox-Ingerson-Ross
process. Vecer, Kopriva, and Ichiba (2009) have shown that in-play football bets
may have additional sensitivities on the top of the standard Poisson model, for
instance sensitivities to red cards.
The Fundamental Theorems of Asset Pricing form the basis of the risk-neutral
framework of financial mathematics and derivative pricing and have been developed
by several authors, including Cox and Ross (1976), Harrison and Kreps (1979),
Harrison and Pliska (1981), Harrison and Pliska (1983), Huang (1985), Duffie (1988)
and Back and Pliska (1991). The first fundamental theorem states that a market
is arbitrage free if and only if there exists a probability measure under which the
underlying asset prices are martingales. The second fundamental theorem states that
the market is complete, (that is, any derivative product of the underlying assets can
be dynamically replicated) if and only if the martingale measure is unique.
In this paper we use independent standard time-homogeneous Poisson processes
to model the scores of the two teams. We construct a market of three underlying
assets and show that within this model a unique martingale measure exists and
therefore the market of in-play football bets is arbitrage-free and complete. Then
we demonstrate calibration and replication performance using market data.
The structure of this paper is the following. Section 2 contains a general overview
of in-play football betting and an overview of the data set. Section 3 defines the
formal model and contains pricing formulae for Arrow-Debreu securities among
others. In Section 4 we calibrate the model to historical market quotes of in-play
bets and in Section 5 we use the same data to show that Next Goal bets are natural
hedging instruments that can be used to build a replicating portfolio to match
the values of other bets, in particular the liquidly traded Match Odds bets. The
Appendix reports analytical pricing formulae for some of the most liquidly traded
bets.
2. In-Play Football Betting
In traditional football betting, also known as pre-game or fixed odds betting, bets
are placed before the beginning of the game. In-play football betting enables bettors
to place bets on the outcome of a game after it started. The main difference is
that during in-play betting, as the game progresses and as the teams score goals,
the chances of certain outcomes jump to new levels and so do the odds of the
bets. Prices move smoothly between goals and jump once a goal is scored. In-
play betting became increasingly popular in recent years. For instance, Compliance
(2013) recently reported that for one particular bookmaker (Unibet) in-play betting
revenues exceeded pre-game betting revenues by 2013Q2 as shown in Figure 1.
There are two main styles of in-play betting: odds betting and spread betting.
In odds betting, the events offered are similar to digital options in the sense that
the bettor wins a certain amount if the event happens and loses a certain amount
otherwise. Typical odds bets are whether one team wins the game, whether the total
number of goals is above a certain number or whether the next goal is scored by
the home team. In spread betting, the bets offered are such that the bettor can win
or lose an arbitrary amount. A typical example is a bet called “total goal minutes”
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Figure 1. Revenue distribution of one particular bookmaker’s (Unibet) football betting revenues between
In-Play and Pre-Game football betting.
which pays the bettor the sum of the minute time of each goal. In this paper we
focus on odds betting, but most of the results can also be applied to spread betting.
A study of spread betting containing analytical pricing formulae for various spread
bets was published by Fitt, Howls, and Kabelka (2005).
In-play betting offers various types of events such as total goals, home and away
goals, individual player goals, cards, corners, injuries and other events. This paper
focuses on bets related to goal events only.
Throughout the paper we refer to the value Xt of a bet as the price at which
the bet can be bought or sold at time t assuming that the bet pays a fixed amount
of 1 unit in case it wins and zero otherwise. This is a convenient notation from a
mathematical point of view, however it is worth noting that different conventions
are used for indicating prices in betting markets. The two most popular conventions
are called fractional odds and decimal odds. Both of these conventions rely on the
assumption that the bettor wagers a fixed stake when the bet is placed and enjoys
a payoff in case the bet wins or no payoff in case it loses. Fractional odds is the net
payoff of the bet in case the bet wins (that is, payoff minus stake), divided by the
stake. Decimal odds is the total payoff of the bet in case the bet wins, divided by
the stake. Therefore, the value of a bet Xt is always equal to the reciprocal of the
decimal odds which is equal to the reciprocal of fractional odds plus one, formally:
Xt =
1
Decimal t
=
1
Fractional t + 1
, (1)
where Decimal t denotes decimal and Fractional t denotes fractional odds. Most of
the market data we used was originally represented as decimal odds, but they were
converted to bet values using the above formula for all the figures and for the
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underlying calculations in this paper.
It is also worth noting that bets can be bought or sold freely during the game.
This includes going short which is referred to as lay betting. Mathematically this
means that the amount held can be a negative number.
In-play bets can be purchased from retail bookmakers at a price offered by the
bookmaker, but can also be traded on centralized marketplaces where the exchange
merely matches orders of participants trading with each other through a limit order
book and keeps a deposit from each party to cover potential losses.
2.1 An example game
In order to demonstrate our results we selected the Portugal vs. Netherlands game
from the UEFA Euro 2012 Championship which was played on the 22nd of June
2012. The reason for selecting this particular game is that the game had a rather
complex unfolding with Netherlands scoring the first goal, but then Portugal taking
the lead in the second half and finally winning the game. This made the odds jump
several times during the game which makes it a good candidate for demonstrating
how the model performs in an extreme situation. The number of goals as a function
of game time is shown in Figure 2.
Figures 3 and 4 show market values of two bet types traded on a betting market
called Betfair: Match Odds and Over-Under. Match Odds contains three bets: home
team winning the game, away team winning the game and the draw. Over-Under
contains bets on the total number of goals where Under X.5 is a bet that pays off
if the total number of goals is equal or less than X. The dashed lines show the best
buy and sell offers on the market while the continuous lines show the calibrated
model values (see Section 4).
In case of Match Odds, the value of the bet for Netherlands winning the game
jumped after Netherlands scored the first goal. When the scores became even after
Portugal scored a goal, the value of the Draw bet jumped up and when Portugal
took the lead by scoring the third goal, the value of the bet for Portugal winning the
game jumped up. Finally, by the end of the game the value of the bet for Portugal
winning the game converged to 1 and the value of the other bets went to zero.
In case of the Over-Under bets, trading ceased for the Under 0.5 bet after the first
goal when the value of this bet jumped to zero. By the end of the game, the value
of the Under 3.5, 4.5, 5.5, 6.5 and 7.5 bets reached 1 because the total number of
goals was actually 3 and the values of the Under 0.5, 1.5 and 2.5 bets went to zero.
3. Mathematical framework
In this section we present a risk-neutral valuation framework for in-play football
betting. To do so we follow the financial mathematical approach, in which we start
by assuming a probability space, then identify a market of underlying tradable
assets and postulate a model for the dynamics of these assets. We show that the
first and second fundamental theorems of asset pricing apply to this market, that is
the market is arbitrage-free and complete which means that all derivatives can be
replicated by taking a dynamic position in the underlying assets.
In classical finance, the distinction between the underlying asset (for example a
stock) and a derivative (for example an option on the stock) is natural. This is not
the case in football betting; there is no such clear distinction between underlying
4
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Figure 2. Scores of the two teams during the Portugal vs. Netherlands game on the 22nd of June, 2012.
The half time result was 1-1 and the final result was a 2-1 win for Portugal.
and derivative assets because all bets are made on the scores, and the score process
itself is not a tradable asset. In order to be able to apply the Fundamental Theorems
of Asset Pricing we need to artificially introduce underlying assets and define the
model by postulating a price dynamics for these assets in the physical measure. It is
also desirable to chose underlying assets that have a simple enough price dynamics
so that developing the replicating portfolio becomes as straightforward as possible.
For these reasons, the two underlying assets of our choice are assets that at the
end of the game pay out the number of goals scored by the home and away teams,
respectively. It is important to note that these assets are not traded in practice
and the choice therefore seems unnatural. However, these underlying assets can be
statically replicated from Arrow-Debreu securities that are referred to as Correct
Score bets in football betting and are traded in practice. Furthermore, towards the
end of the Section 3.2 we arrive at Proposition 3.12 which states that any two
linearly independent bets can be used as hedging instruments. Therefore the choice
of the underlying assets is practically irrelevant and only serves a technical purpose.
This result is applied in Section 5 where Next Goal bets are used as natural hedging
instruments.
3.1 Setup
Let us consider a probability space (Ω,F ,P) that carries two independent Poisson
processes N1t , N
2
t with respective intensities µ1, µ2 and the filtration (Ft)t∈[0,T ]
generated by these processes. Let time t = 0 denote the beginning and t = T the
end of the game. The Poisson processes represent the number of goals scored by
5
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Figure 3. Values of the three Match Odds bets during the game: Draw (black), Portugal Win (red),
Netherlands Win (blue). Dashed lines represent the best market buy and sell offers while the continuous
lines represent the calibrated model values. Note that the value of the Netherlands Win bet jumps up after
the first goal because the chance for Netherlands winning the game suddenly increased. It jumped down for
similar reasons when Portugal scored it’s first goal and at the same time the value of the Portugal Win and
Draw bets jumped up. By the end of the game, because Portugal actually won the game, the value of the
Portugal Win bet reached 1 while both other bets became worthless.
the teams, the superscript 1 refers to the home and 2 refers to the away team. This
notation is used throughout, the distinction between superscripts and exponents
will always be clear from the context. The probability measure P is the real-world
or physical probability measure.
We assume that there exists a liquid market where three assets can be traded
continuously with no transaction costs or any restrictions on short selling or bor-
rowing. The first asset Bt is a risk-free bond that bears no interests, an assumption
that is motivated by the relatively short time frame of a football game. The second
and third assets S1t and S
2
t are such that their values at the end of the game are
equal to the number of goals scored by the home and away teams, respectively.
Definition 3.1 (model). The model is defined by the following price dynamics of
the assets:
Bt = 1
S1t = N
1
t + λ1 (T − t) (2)
S2t = N
2
t + λ2 (T − t)
where λ1 and λ2 are known real constants.
Essentially, the underlying asset prices are compensated Poisson processes, but the
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Figure 4. Values of Over/Under bets during the game. Under X.5 is a bet that pays off in case the total
number of goals by the end of the game is below or equal to X. Marked lines represent the calibrated model
prices while the grey bands show the best market buy and sell offers. Note that after the first goal trading
in the Under 0.5 bet ceased and it became worthless. By the end of the game when the total number of
goals was 3, all the bets up until Under 2.5 became worthless while the Under 3.5 and higher bets reached
a value of 1.
compensators λ1, λ2 are not necessarily equal to the intensities µ1, µ2 and therefore
the prices are not necessarilty martingales in the physical measure P. This is similar
to the Black-Scholes model where the stock’s drift in the physical measure is not
necessarily equal to the risk-free rate.
We are now closely following Harrison and Pliska (1981) in defining the necessary
concepts.
3.2 Risk-neutral pricing of bets
Definition 3.2 (trading strategy). A trading strategy is an Ft-predictable vec-
tor process φt =
(
φ0t , φ
1
t , φ
2
t
)
that satisfies
∫ t
0
∣∣φis∣∣ ds < ∞ for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The
associated value process is denoted by
V φt = φ
0
tBt + φ
1
tS
1
t + φ
2
tS
2
t . (3)
The trading strategy is self-financing if
V φt = V
φ
0 +
∫ t
0
φ1sdS
1
s +
∫ t
0
φ2sdS
2
s . (4)
where
∫ t
0 φ
i
sdS
i
s, i ∈ {1, 2} is a Lebesgue Stieltjes integral which is well defined
according to Proposition 2.3.2 on p17 of Bre´maud (1981).
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Definition 3.3 (arbitrage-freeness). The model is arbitrage-free if no self-
financing trading strategy φt exist such that P
[
V φt − V φ0 ≥ 0
]
= 1 and
P
[
V φt − V φ0 > 0
]
> 0.
Definition 3.4 (bet). A bet (also referred to as a contingent claim or derivative)
is an FT -measurable random variable XT .
In practical terms this means that the value of a bet is revealed at the end of the
game.
Definition 3.5 (completeness). The model is complete if for every bet XT there
exists a self-financing trading strategy φt such that XT = V
φ
T . In this case we say
that the bet XT is replicated by the trading strategy φt.
Theorem 3.6 (risk-neutral measure). There exists a probability measure Q re-
ferred to as the risk-neutral equivalent martingale measure such that:
(a) The asset processes Bt, S
1
t , S
2
t are Q-martingales.
(b) The goal processes N1t and N
2
t in measure Q are standard Poisson processes
with intensities λ1 and λ2 respectively (which are in general different from the
P-intensities of µ1 and µ2).
(c) Q is an equivalent measure to P, that is the set of events having zero probability
is the same for both measures.
(d) Q is unique.
Proof. The proof relies on Girsanov’s theorem for point processes (see Theorem 2
on p.165 and Theorem 3 on page 166 in Bre´maud (1981)) which states that N1t and
N2t are Poisson processes with intensities λ1 and λ2 under the probability measure
Q which is defined by the Radon-Nikodym-derivative
dQ
dP
= Lt, (5)
where
Lt =
2∏
i=1
(
λi
µi
)N it
exp [(µi − λi) t] . (6)
Then uniqueness follows from Theorem 8 on p.64 in Bre´maud (1981) which states
that if two measures have the same set of intensities, then the two measures must
coincide. The Integration Theorem on p.27 of Bre´maud (1981) states that N it − λit
are Q-martingales, therefore the assets Sit are also Q-martingales for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proposition 9.5 of Tankov (2004) claims that P and Q are equivalent probability
measures. The process of the bond asset Bt is a trivial martingale in every measure
because it’s a deterministic constant which therefore doesn’t depend on the measure.
Remark 3.7. Changing the measure of a Poisson process changes the intensity and
leaves the drift unchanged. This is in contrast with the case of a Wiener process
where change of measure changes the drift and leaves the volatility unchanged.
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Theorem 3.8. (arbitrage-free) The model is arbitrage-free and complete.
Proof. This follows directly from the first and second fundamental theorems of fi-
nance. To be more specific, arbitrage-freeness follows from theorem 1.1 of Delbaen
and Schachermayer (1994) which states that the existence of a risk-neutral mea-
sure implies a so-called condition “no free lunch with vanishing risk” which implies
arbitrage-freeness. Completeness follows from theorem 3.36 of Harrison and Pliska
(1981) which states that the model is complete if the risk-neutral measure is unique.
Alternatively it also follows from theorem 3.35 which states that the model is com-
plete if the martingale representation theorem holds for all martingales which is the
case according to Theorem 17, p.76 of Bre´maud (1981).
Corollary 3.9. The time-t value of a bet is equal to the risk-neutral expectation
of it’s value at the end of the game, formally:
Xt = E
Q [XT |Ft] . (7)
Proof. This follows directly from Proposition 3.31 of Harrison and Pliska (1981).
Corollary 3.10. The time-t value of a bet is also equal to the value of the associ-
ated self-financing trading strategy φt, formally:
Xt = V
φ
t = V
φ
0 +
∫ t
0
φ1sdS
1
s +
∫ t
0
φ2sdS
2
s . (8)
Proof. This follows directly from Proposition 3.32 of Harrison and Pliska (1981).
Definition 3.11 (linear independence). The bets Z1T and Z
2
T are linearly in-
dependent if the self-financing trading strategy φ1t =
(
φ10t , φ
11
t , φ
12
t
)
that replicates
Z1T is P-almost surely linearly independent from the self-financing trading strategy
φ2t =
(
φ20t , φ
21
t , φ
22
t
)
that replicates Z2T . Formally, at any time t ∈ [0, T ] and for any
constants c1, c2 ∈ R
c1φ
1
t 6= c2φ2t P a.s. (9)
Proposition 3.12 (replication). Any bet XT can be replicated by taking a dynamic
position in any two linearly independent bets Z1T and Z
2
T , formally:
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
ψ1sdZ
1
s +
∫ t
0
ψ2sdZ
2
s , (10)
where the weights ψ1t , ψ
2
t are equal to the solution of the following equation:(
φ11t φ
12
t
φ21t φ
22
t
)(
ψ1t
ψ2t
)
=
(
φ1t
φ2t
)
(11)
where
(
φ11t , φ
12
t
)
,
(
φ21t , φ
22
t
)
and
(
φ1t , φ
2
t
)
are the components of the trading strat-
egy that replicates Z1T , Z
2
T and XT , respectively. The integral
∫ t
0 ψ
1
sdZ
1
s is to be
9
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interpreted in the following sense:∫ t
0
ψ1sdZ
1
s =
∫ t
0
ψ1sφ
11
s dS
1
s +
∫ t
0
ψ1sφ
12
s dS
2
s (12)
and similarly for
∫ t
0 ψ
2
sdZ
2
s .
Proof. Substituting dZ1t = φ
11
t dS
1
t + φ
21
t dS
2
t , dZ
2
t = φ
12
t dS
1
t + φ
22
t dS
2
t and Equation
8 into Equation 10 verifies the proposition.
3.3 European bets
Definition 3.13 (European bet). A European bet is a bet with a value depending
only on the final number of goals N1T , N
2
T , that is one of the form
XT = Π
(
N1T , N
2
T
)
(13)
where Π is a known scalar function N × N → R which is referred to as the payoff
function.
Example 3.14. A typical example is a bet that pays out 1 if the home team
scores more goals than the away team (home wins) and pays nothing otherwise,
that is Π
(
N1T , N
2
T
)
= 1
(
N1T > N
2
T
)
where the function 1 (A) takes the value of 1
if A is true and zero otherwise. Another example is a bet that pays out 1 if the
total number of goals is strictly higher than 2 and pays nothing otherwise, that is
Π
(
N1T , N
2
T
)
= 1
(
N1T +N
2
T > 2
)
.
Proposition 3.15 (pricing formula). The time-t value of a European bet with
payoff function Π is given by the explicit formula
Xt =
∞∑
n1=N t1
∞∑
n2=N t2
Π (n1, n2)P
(
n1 −N1t , λ1 (T − t)
)
P
(
n2 −N2t , λ2 (T − t)
)
, (14)
where P (N,Λ) is the Poisson probability, that is P (N,Λ) = e
−Λ
N ! Λ
N if N ≥ 0 and
P (N,Λ) = 0 otherwise.
Proof. This follows directly form Proposition 3.9 and Definition 3.13.
As we have seen, the price of a European bet is a function of the time t and the
number of goals
(
N1t , N
2
t
)
and intensities (λ1, λ2). Therefore, from now on we will
denote this function by Xt = Xt
(
N1t , N
2
t
)
or Xt = Xt
(
t,N1t , N
2
t , λ1, λ2
)
, depending
on whether the context requires the explicit dependence on intensities or not.
It is important to note that Arrow-Debreu bets do exist in in-play football betting
and are referred to as Correct Score bets.
Definition 3.16 (Arrow-Debreu bets). Arrow-Debreu bets, also known as Cor-
rect Score bets are European bets with a payoff function ΠAD(K1,K2) equal to 1 if
the final score
(
N1T , N
2
T
)
is equal to a specified result (K1,K2) and 0 otherwise:
ΠAD(K1,K2) = 1
(
N1T = K1, N
2
T = K2
)
(15)
10
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According to the following proposition, Arrow-Debreu bets can be used to stati-
cally replicate any European bet:
Proposition 3.17 (static replication). The time-t value of a European bet with
payoff function Π in terms of time-t values of Arrow-Debreu bets is given by:
Xt =
∞∑
K1=N t1
∞∑
K2=N t2
Π (K1,K2)Xt,AD(K1,K2), (16)
where Xt,AD(K1,K2) denotes the time-t value of an Arrow-Debreu bet that pays out
if the final scores are equal to (K1,K2).
Proof. This follows directly form Proposition 3.15 and Definition 3.16.
Let us now define the partial derivatives of the bet values with respect to change
in time and the number goals scored. These are required for hedging and serve the
same purpose as the greeks in the Black-Scholes framework.
Definition 3.18 (Greeks). The greeks are the values of the following forward dif-
ference operators (δ1, δ2) and partial derivative operator applied to the bet value:
δ1Xt
(
N1t , N
2
t
)
= Xt
(
N1t + 1, N
2
t
)−Xt (N1t , N2t ) (17)
δ2Xt
(
N1t , N
2
t
)
= Xt
(
N1t , N
2
t + 1
)−Xt (N1t , N2t ) (18)
∂tXt
(
N1t , N
2
t
)
= lim
dt→0
1
dt
[
Xt+dt
(
N1t , N
2
t
)−Xt (N1t , N2t )] (19)
Remark. The forward difference operators δ1, δ2 play the role of Delta and the
partial derivative operator ∂t plays the role of Theta in the Black-Scholes framework.
Theorem 3.19 (Kolmogorov forward equation). The value of a European bet
X
(
t,N1t , N
2
t
)
with a payoff function Π(N1T , N
2
T ) satisfies the following Feynman-Kac
representation on the time interval t ∈ [0, T ] which is also known as the Kolmogorov
forward equation:
∂tX
(
t,N1t , N
2
t
)
= −λ1δ1X
(
t,N1t , N
2
t
)− λ2δ2X (t,N1t , N2t ) (20)
with boundary condition:
XT
(
T,N1T , N
2
T
)
= Π
(
N1T , N
2
T
)
.
Proof. The proposition can be easily verified using the closed form formula from
Proposition 3.15. Furthermore, several proofs are available in the literature, see for
example Proposition 12.6 in Tankov (2004), Theorem 6.2 in Ross (2006) or Equation
13 in Feller (1940).
Remark 3.20. Equation 20 also has the consequence that any portfolio of Euro-
pean bets that changes no value if either team scores a goal (Delta-neutral) does
not change value between goals either (Theta-neutral). We note without a proof,
that this holds for all bets in general.
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Corollary 3.21. The value of a European bet X
(
t,N1t , N
2
t , λ1, λ2
)
satisfies the
following:
∂
∂λi
Xt = (T − t) δiXt (21)
where i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. This follows directly from Proposition 3.15.
Proposition 3.22 (portfolio weights). The components
(
φ1t , φ
2
t
)
of the trading
strategy that replicates a European bet XT are equal to the forward difference
operators (δ1, δ2) of the bet, formally:
φ1t = δ1X
(
t,N1t , N
2
t
)
(22)
φ2t = δ2X
(
t,N1t , N
2
t
)
. (23)
Proof. Recall that according to Proposition 3.10, the time-t value of a bet is equal
to Xt = X0 +
∑2
i=1
∫ t
0 φ
i
sdS
i
s, which after substituting dS
i
t = dN
i
t − λidt becomes
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
(
φ1sλ1 + φ
2
sλ2
)
ds
+
N1t∑
k=0
φ1t1k +
N2t∑
k=0
φ2t2k , (24)
where we used
∫ t
0 φ
i
sdN
i
s =
∑N it
k=0 φ
i
t1k
where 0 ≤ tik ≤ t is the time of the k.th jump
(goal) of the process N it for i ∈ {1, 2}.
On the other hand, using Ito’s formula for jump processes (Proposition 8.15,
Tankov (2004)), which applies because the closed form formula in Proposition 3.15
is infinitely differentiable, the value of a European bet is equal to
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
∂sX
(
s,N1s , N
2
s
)
ds
+
N1t∑
k=0
δ1X
(
t1k, N
1
t1k−, N
2
t1k−
)
+
N2t∑
k=0
δ2X
(
t2k, N
1
t2k−, N
2
t2k−
)
, (25)
where tik− refers to the fact that the value of the processes is to be taken before the
jump.
Because the equality between Equations 24 and 25 hold for every possible jump
times, the terms behind the sums are equal which proves the proposition.
4. Model Calibration
In this section we discuss how to calibrate the model parameters to historical market
prices. We demonstrate that a unique equivalent martingale measure Q exists, that
is, a set of intensities λ1, λ2 exist that are consistent with the prices of all bets
observed on the market (see Propositions 3.6 and 3.8).
12
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We apply a least squares approach in which we consider market prices of a set
of bets and find model intensities that deliver model prices for these bets that are
as close as possible to the market prices. Specifically, we minimize the sum of the
square of the weighted differences between the model and market mid prices as a
function of model intensities, using market bid-ask spreads as weights. The reason
for choosing a bid-ask spread weighting is that we would like to take into account
bets with a lower bid-ask spread with a higher weight because the price of these
bets is assumed to be more certain. Formally, we minimize the following expression:
R
(
λ1t , λ
2
t
)
=
√√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
Xi,MIDt −Xit (λ1t , λ2t , N1t , N2t )
1
2
(
Xi,SELLt −Xi,BUYt
)
2, (26)
where n is the total number of bets used, Xi,BUYt and X
i,SELL
t are the best market
buy and sell quotes of the i.th type of bet at time t, Xi,MIDt is the market mid price
which is the average of the best buy and sell quotes, Xit
(
N1t , N
2
t , λ
1
t , λ
2
t
)
is the model
price of the i.th bet at time t, given the current number of goals N1t , N
2
t and model
intensity parameters λ1t , λ
2
t , see Proposition 3.15. This minimization procedure is
referred to as model calibration.
Calibration has been performed using a time step of 1 minute during the game,
independently at each time step. We used the three most liquid groups of bets which
in our case were Match Odds, Over / Under and Correct Score with a total of 31
bet types in these three categories. Appendix A describes these bet types in detail.
The continuous lines in Figures 3 and 4 show the calibrated model prices while
the dashed lines are the market buy and sell offers. It can be seen that the calibrated
values are close to the market quotes, although they are not always within the bid-
ask spread. As the measures of the goodness of the fit we use the optimal value of
the cost function of Equation 26, which is the average distance of the calibrated
values from the market mid prices in units of bid-ask spread, the calibration error
is shown in Figure 5. We performed calibration for multiple games of the Euro 2012
Championship, the time average of the calibration errors for each game is shown in
Table 1. The mean and standard deviation of the calibration errors across games
is 1.57 ± 0.27 which is to be interpreted in units of bid-ask spread because of the
weighting of the error function in Equation 26. This means, that on average, the
calibrated values are outside of the bid-ask spread, but not significantly. Given that
a model of only 2 parameters has been calibrated to a total of 31 independent
market quotes, this is a reasonably good result.
Finally, the implied intensities, along with the estimated uncertainties of the cal-
ibration using the bid-ask spreads are shown in Figure 6. Contrary to our initial
assumption of constant intensities, the actual intensities fluctuate over time and
there also seems to be an increasing trend in the implied goal intensities of both
teams.
In order to better understand the nature of the implied intensity process, we
estimated the drift and volatility of the log total intensity, that is we assumed the
following:
d ln
(
λ1t + λ
2
t
)
= µdt+ σdWt (27)
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Figure 5. Calibration error during the game. Calibration error is defined as the average distance of all
31 calibrated bet values from the market mid prices in units of bid-ask spread. A formal definition is given
by Equation 26. Note that the calibration error for this particular game is usually between 1 and 2 bid-ask
spreads which is a reasonably good result, given that the model has only 2 free parameters to explain all
31 bet values.
where µ and σ are the drift and volatility of the process. Table 2 shows the results
of the estimation for multiple games. The mean and standard deviation of the drift
terms are µ = 0.55 ± 0.16 1/90min while the mean and standard deviation of the
volatility terms are σ = 0.51±0.19 1/√90min. The fact that implied goal intensities
are increasing during the game is consistent with findings of Dixon and Robinson
(1998) who found gradual increase of scoring rates by analysing goal times of 4012
matches between 1993 and 1996.
5. Hedging with Next Goal bets
In this section we demonstrate market completeness and we show that Next Goal
bets are natural hedging instruments that can be used to dynamically replicate and
hedge other bets.
Recall that according to Proposition 3.12 any European bet Xt can be replicated
by dynamically trading in two linearly independent instruments Z1t and Z
2
t :
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
ψ1sdZ
1
s +
∫ t
0
ψ2sdZ
2
s (28)
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Figure 6. Calibrated model parameters, also referred to as implied intensities during the game. Formally,
this is equal to the minimizer λ1t , λ
2
t of Equation 26. The bands show the parameter uncertainties estimated
from the bid-ask spreads of the market values of the bets. Note that the intensities appear to have an
increasing trend and also fluctuate over time.
Game Calibration Error
Denmark v Germany 1.65
Portugal v Netherlands 1.18
Spain v Italy 2.21
Sweden v England 1.58
Italy v Croatia 1.45
Germany v Italy 1.50
Germany v Greece 1.34
Netherlands v Germany 1.78
Spain v Rep of Ireland 1.64
Spain v France 1.40
Average 1.57
Standard deviation 0.27
Table 1. Average calibration errors in units of bid-ask spread as shown in Figure 5 have been calculated
for multiple games of the UEFA Euro 2012 Championship and are shown in this table. Note that the mean
of the averages is just 1.57 bid-ask spreads with a standard deviation of 0.27 which shows that the model
fit is reasonably good for the games analysed.
where the portfolio weights ψ1t , ψ
2
t are equal to the solution of the equation(
δ1Z
1
t δ1Z
2
t
δ2Z
1
t δ2Z
2
t
)(
ψ1t
ψ2t
)
=
(
δ1Xt
δ2Xt
)
, (29)
where the values of the finite difference operators δ (Definition 3.18) can be com-
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Game Drift [1/90min] Vol [1/
√
90min]
Denmark v Germany 0.36 0.28
Portugal v Netherlands 0.49 0.44
Spain v Italy 0.60 0.76
Sweden v England 0.58 0.59
Italy v Croatia 0.82 0.60
Germany v Italy 0.76 0.39
Germany v Greece 0.65 0.66
Netherlands v Germany 0.43 0.32
Spain v Rep of Ireland 0.32 0.78
Spain v France 0.48 0.25
Average 0.55 0.51
Standard deviation 0.16 0.19
Table 2. Average drift and volatility of total log-intensities estimated for multiple games of the UEFA
Euro 2012 Championship. Note that the drift term is positive for all games which is consistent with the
empirical observation of increasing goal frequencies as the game progresses.
Figure 7. Replicating the Match Odds home, away and draw contracts using Next Goal home and away
contracts as hedging instruments. The left column shows the replication performance with the dashed line
showing the value of the original Match Odds contracts and the continuous line showing the value of the
replicating portfolio. The right column shows the weights of the replicating portfolio with the dashed line
showing the weight of the Next Goal home contract and the dotted line showing the weight of the Next
Goal away contract.
puted using Proposition 3.15 using the calibrated model intensities. Equation 29
tells us that the change in the replicating portfolio must match the change of the
bet value Xt in case either team scores a goal. This approach is analogous to delta
hedging in the Black Scholes framework.
The two bets that we use as replicating instruments are the Next Goal home and
the Next Goal away bets. These bets settle during the game in a way such that
16
November 12, 2018 . Football˙HEAD
when the home team scores a goal the price of the Next Goal home bet jumps to 1
and the price of the Next Goal away bet jumps to zero and vice versa for the away
team. After the goal the bets reset and trade again at their regular market price.
The values of the bets are:
ZNG1t =
λ1
λ1 + λ2
[
1− e−(λ1+λ2)(T−t)
]
(30)
ZNG2t =
λ2
λ1 + λ2
[
1− e−(λ1+λ2)(T−t)
]
. (31)
The matrix of deltas, that is the changes of contract values in case of a goal as
defined in 3.18 are:
(
δ1Z
NG1
t δ1Z
NG2
t
δ2Z
NG1
t δ2Z
NG2
t
)
=
(
1− ZNG1t −ZNG2t
−ZNG1t 1− ZNG2t
)
(32)
The reason for choosing Next Goal bets as hedging instruments is that these
bets are linearly independent (see Definition 3.11), that is the delta matrix is non-
singular even if there is a large goal difference between the two teams. Note that this
is an advantage compared to using the Match Odds bets as hedging instruments: in
case one team leads by several goals, it is almost certain that the team will win. In
that case the value of the Match Odds bets goes close to 1 for the given team and
0 for the other team. An additional goal does not change the values significantly,
therefore the delta matrix becomes singular and the bets are not suitable for hedging
because the portfolio weights go to infinity. This is never the case with Next Goal
bets which can therefore be used as natural hedging instruments.
We used the Portugal vs. Netherlands game from Section 2.1 to replicate the values
of the three Match Odds bets, using the Next Goal bets as hedging instruments.
Figure 7 shows the values of the original Match Odds bets along with the values of
the replicating portfolios (left column) and the replicating portfolio weights (right
column).
Figure 8 shows the jumps of contract values against the jumps of replicating port-
folio values at times when a goal was scored. This figure contains several different
types of bets, that is not only Match Odds bets, but also Over/Under and Cor-
rect Score bets. The figure also contains all 3 goals scored during the Portugal vs.
Netherlands game. It can be seen that the jumps of the original contract values
are in line with the jumps of the replicating portfolio values with a correlation of
89%. Table 3 shows these correlations for multiple games of the UEFA Euro 2012
Championship. It can be seen that the correlations are reasonably high for all games
with an average of 80% and a standard deviation of 19%.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that the Fundamental Theorems of Asset Pricing apply
to the market of in-play football bets if the scores are assumed to follow independent
Poisson processes of constant intensities. We developed general formulae for pricing
and replication. We have shown that the model of only 2 parameters calibrates
17
November 12, 2018 . Football˙HEAD
Figure 8. Jumps of actual contract values (horizontal axis) versus jumps of replicating portfolio values
(vertical axis) at times of goals scored during the Portugal vs. Netherlands game. The changes are computed
between the last traded price before a goal and the first traded price after a goal, for all goals. The figure
contains Match Odds, Over/Under and Correct Score bets. Next Goal home and away bets were used
as hedging instruments to build the replicating portfolios. Note that the value changes of the replicating
portfolios corresponds reasonably well to the value changes of the original contracts with a correlation of
89%.
Game Correlation
Denmark vs. Germany 79%
Portugal vs. Netherlands 89%
Spain vs. Italy 97%
Italy vs. Croatia 47%
Spain vs. France 86%
Germany vs. Italy 99%
Germany vs. Greece 60%
Netherlands vs. Germany 93%
Spain vs. Rep of Ireland 98%
Sweden vs. England 50%
Average 80%
Standard deviation 19%
Table 3. Correlation between the jumps of bet values and jumps of replicating portfolios at times of goals
for all bets of a game.
to 31 different bets with an error of less than 2 bid-ask spreads. Furthermore, we
have shown that the model can also be used for replication and hedging. Overall
we obtained good agreement between actual contract values and the values of the
corresponding replicating portfolios, however we point out that hedging errors can
sometimes be significant due to the fact the implied intensities are in practice not
constant.
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Appendix A. Valuation formulae
This section summarizes a list of analytical formulae for the values of some of the
most common in-play football bets. In the first sub-section we consider European
bets, while the second sub-section contains non-European bets.
A.1 European Bets
The value of a European bet at the end of the game only depends on the final
scores. The formulae of this section follow directly from Proposition 3.15. Table A1
summarizes the payoff functions and the valuation formulae for some of the most
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Bet type Payoff Π
(
N1T , N
2
T
)
Value Xt
(
N1t , N
2
t , λ1, λ2
)
Match Odds Home 1
(
N1T > N
2
T
) ∑
k1>k2
∏2
i=1 P
(
ki −N it ,Λi
)
Match Odds Away 1
(
N1T < N
2
T
) ∑
k1<k2
∏2
i=1 P
(
ki −N it ,Λi
)
Match Odds Draw 1
(
N1T = N
2
T
) ∑
k1=k2
∏2
i=1 P
(
ki −N it ,Λi
)
Arrow-Debreu K1,K2 1
(
N1T = K1, N
2
T = K2
) ∏2
i=1 P
(
Ki −N it ,Λi
)
Over K 1
(
N1T +N
2
T > K
) ∑∞
k=K+1 P
(
k −N1t −N2t , (Λ1 + Λ2)
)
Under K 1
(
N1T +N
2
T < K
) ∑K−1
k=0 P
(
k −N1t −N2t , (Λ1 + Λ2)
)
Odd 1
(
N1T +N
2
T = 1 mod 2
)
exp [− (Λ1 + Λ2)] cosh [(Λ1 + Λ2)]
Even 1
(
N1T +N
2
T = 0 mod 2
)
exp [− (Λ1 + Λ2)] sinh [(Λ1 + Λ2)]
Winning Margin K 1
(
N1T −N2T = K
) exp [− (Λ1 + Λ2)](Λ1Λ2)K−N
1
t +N
2
t
2
·B|K−N1t +N2t |
(
2
√
Λ1Λ2
)
Table A1. Valuation formulae for some of the most common types of in-play football bets. Π
(
N1T , N
2
T
)
denotes the payoff function, that is the value of the European bet at the end of the game. P (k,Λ) denotes
the Poisson distribution, that is P (k,Λ) = 1
k!
e−ΛΛk and Λi = λi (T − t) with i ∈ {1, 2} for the home and
the away team, respectively.
common types of European bets.
Match Odds Home, Away and Draw bets pay out depending on the final result
of the game. The Arrow-Debreu K1,K2 bets pay out if the final scores are equal to
K1,K2. Over K and Under K bets pay out if the total number of goals is over or
under K. Odd and Even bets pay out if the total number of goals is an odd or an
even number.
The Winning Margin K bet wins if the difference between the home and away
scores is equal to K. The value of this bet follows the Skellam distribution, Bk (z)
denotes the modified Bessel function of the first kind.
A.2 Non-European Bets
Bets in this category have a value at the end of the game that depends not only
on the final score, but also on the score before the end of the game or the order of
scores. We consider two popular bets in this category: Next Goal and Half Time /
Full Time bets. Valuation of these bets follows from Corollary 3.9.
A.2.1 Next Goal. The Next Goal Home bet wins if the home team scores the next
goal. The value of this bet is
Xt =
λ1
λ1 + λ2
[
1− e−(λ1+λ2)(T−t)
]
. (A1)
Similarly, the value of the Next Goal Away bet is equal to
Xt =
λ2
λ1 + λ2
[
1− e−(λ1+λ2)(T−t)
]
. (A2)
A.2.2 Half Time / Full Time. Half Time / Full Time bets win if the half time
and the full time is won by the predicted team or is a draw. Given that there are 3
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outcomes in each halves, there are 9 bets in this category. For example, the value of
the Half Time Home / Full Time Draw bet before the end of the first half is equal
to:
Xt =
∑
k1>k2
∑
l1=l2
P
(
k1 −N1t , λ1
(
T 1
2
− t
))
P
(
k2 −N2t , λ2
(
T 1
2
− t
))
×P
(
l1 − k1, λ1
(
T − T 1
2
))
P
(
l2 − k2, λ2
(
T − T 1
2
))
.(A3)
In the second half, this bet either becomes worthless if the first half was not won
by the home team or otherwise becomes equal to the Draw bet.
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